Uniqueness of the Equilibrium in First-price Auction With Discrete Distributions (Zihe Wang)


First-price auction is widely used in government contracts and auctions for mining leases. I consider the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) in the first-price auction in the asymmetric independent private values model. Maskin and Riley (2000) proved that BNE always exists for any distribution. Lebrun (2006) proved that BNE is unique when the continuous distribution functions are strictly log-concave at the highest lower extremity of the supports. In this talk, I will show the uniqueness of BNE when the distribution is discrete without any distribution assumption.


2017-08-30   13:00 ~ 14:00   


Zihe Wang, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics


Room 602,School of Information Management & Engineering, Shanghai University of Finance & Economics