We study a many-to-many matching problem with ties motivated by the course allocation system in many universities. The complications are due to the simultaneous presence of multi-unit capacities and weak preferences, either of which could make a stable matching not necessarily Pareto efficient. We propose two new competing Pareto stable matching mechanisms known as the Pareto-improving draft and dictatorship mechanisms. These two mechanisms, while both have desirable properties in terms of efficiency and fairness, bring about a tradeoff between strategyproofness and non-callousness. Using unique student-course matching data, our simulations show that both mechanisms significantly improve the overall efficiency and welfare of students, with the draft mechanism outperforming the dictatorship mechanism despite its non-strategyproofness for the students.
2016-12-21 13:45 ~ 14:30
Mengling Li, Xiamen University
Room 102, No.100 Wudong Road, School of Information Management & Engineering, Shanghai University of Finance & Economics